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THE IMPACT OF DICTA IN BUCK V. BELL 
Hilary Eisenberg 
“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”1 
These infamous words are found in Buck v. Bell, a controversial decision 
penned in 1927 by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Buck v. Bell, which 
upheld a Virginia statute allowing the involuntary sterilization of Carrie 
Buck,2 is one of the Supreme Court’s most commonly reviled decisions.3  
Despite such strong criticism, Buck v. Bell has never been expressly 
overturned and is today, still good law.4  Though legal issues surrounding 
reproductive rights fueled contentious debates for the remainder of the 
twentieth century,5 federal courts generally decline to address the issue of 
sterilization on a substantive level. 6   Despite increased protections of 
personal rights as a result of the Supreme Court’s expansion of the right to 
privacy, a judicial trend has emerged shifting involuntary sterilization 
controversies into state courts.7  This trend is currently exemplified by the 
recent case of Mary Moe, where in February of 2012, a Massachusetts judge 
handed down a decision ordering an abortion and sterilization of a severely 
schizophrenic pregnant woman. 8   Following some controversy, 9  the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court quickly overturned this decision. 10   The 
expansion of the right to privacy, and the varied state standards for 
involuntary sterilization that emerged during a mass revision over the later 
	  
 1. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 2. Id. at 205-07. 
 3. Jennifer M. Klein, Compensating Victims of Forced Sterilization: Lessons from 
North Carolina, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 422, 423 (2012). 
 4. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942). Though Buck v. Bell was 
addressed by Skinner v. Oklahoma, it was only distinguished and not expressly 
overturned. 
 5. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 6. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978). 
 7. See infra Part II, notes 99-107 and accompanying text. 
 8. In re Guardianship of Moe, 960 N.E.2d 350, 353-54 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). 
 9. Staci Zaretsky, Quote of the Day: This is American Jurisprudence, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Feb. 22, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/quote-of-the-day-this-
is-american-jurisprudence/. 
 10. In re Guardianship of Moe, 960 N.E.2d at 354-55. 
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twentieth century, indicate that Justice Holmes’ endorsement of eugenic 
sterilization is now merely dicta.11 
This note seeks to explore various state standards for determining if a 
mentally disabled person is incompetent in terms of reproductive rights.  
Part I is a discussion of the evolution of federal case law covering the rights 
of individuals concerning reproductive freedom.  It provides an overview of 
the attitudes courts have taken addressing reproductive rights following Buck 
v. Bell.  Part II of the note reviews how involuntary sterilization cases are 
handled on the state level.  This section discusses in further detail the three 
main approaches taken by state courts.  Through analysis of the underlying 
policy motivations of these approaches, this section explores the legal 
evolution of sterilization standards to include an expanded interpretation of 
substantive due process with a focused inclusion on the fundamental right to 
privacy.  Part III focuses on the modern state of legal reconciliation of due 
process rights with sterilization guidelines using the details of the recent 
Massachusetts involuntary sterilization case, Guardianship of Moe to 
exemplify the continued emphasis on procedural due process rights.  Finally, 
Part IV discusses how, as a result of various state interpretations, the legal 
trend towards allowing standards for administering involuntary sterilization 
actually fits in with the general message of Buck v. Bell in terms of its strong 
emphasis on procedural safeguards.  Part IV contends that the arguments 
expressly endorsing eugenic sterilization are purely dicta, and not binding 
authority.  This discussion leads to the conclusion that in light of the varying 
state standards for sterilization of incompetent persons, the precedent in 
Buck v. Bell binds later society to enforce the protections of both procedural 
and substantive due process.  At this point, this note explains that the Buck v. 
Bell precedent is not, in fact, binding law endorsing eugenic sterilization. 
I. EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY ON STERILIZATION AND 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
In Buck v. Bell, plaintiff Carrie Buck, an eighteen-year-old woman 
described as “feeble minded,” challenged a 1924 Virginia statute that 
authorized the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble 
Minded to order her sterilization.12  Carrie Buck’s mother and illegitimate 
child were also described as “feeble minded.”13  This statute permitted 
superintendents of institutions for the mentally impaired to require 
individuals to be sterilized if they found that it is “for the best interest of the 
patients and of society.”14  The legislative aim of this statute was to promote 
	  
 11. See infra Part IV, notes 264-309 and accompanying text. 
 12. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 206. 
186 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
the health and welfare of the mentally impaired persons and to protect 
society by preventing such individuals from procreating.15 
In the case of Carrie Buck, State Colony followed the procedural 
guidelines of the Virginia statute precisely as they were written.16  After the 
superintendent filed his petition and presented the written evidence in favor 
of her sterilization, Carrie Buck was granted her hearing and allowed to 
appeal, as the statute stipulated.17  However, the focus in Buck v. Bell “is not 
upon the procedure but upon the substantive law.”18   In response to the 
contention on Carrie Buck’s behalf that there could be no justification for 
the sterilization order, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could 
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for 
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, 
in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is 
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate 
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing 
their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.19 
This opinion effectively allowed states to create laws allowing 
compulsory sterilization of mentally challenged people, and has never been 
overturned. 
Justice Holmes’ line of reasoning clearly endorses eugenicist principles in 
the opinion’s justification for compulsory sterilization.20  It is important to 
note that at the time of the Buck v. Bell opinion, more progressive segments 
of society saw eugenics-based policies such as the Virginia statute as a 
means of societal reform, and not oppressive intrusions into the rights of the 
mentally disabled.21  At that point in time, scientific misinterpretations of 
Gregory Mendel’s work22 understood hereditary genetic traits to include 
	  
 15. Id. at 205-06. 
 16. Id. at 207. 
 17. Id. at 205-06. 
 18. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive 
Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 810-11 (1986). 
 21. Scott, supra note 20, at 810-11 n.14. 
 22. Gregory Mendel is generally regarded as the founder of modern genetics. His 
works were not discovered or considered credible until after his death. See Deciphering 
the Genetic Code: Gregor Mendel: The Father of Modern Genetics, NAT’L INSTITUTE 
HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/nirenberg/HS1_mendel.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 
2013). 
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cognitive and psychological qualities.23  Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
decided Buck v. Bell in 1927, almost a decade before Nazi Germany’s 
exercise of eugenicist policies in carrying out mass mandatory sterilizations 
drew the widespread condemnation with which society is now familiar.24 
Following Buck v. Bell, compulsory sterilizations increased exponentially 
throughout the 1930’s.25  These forced sterilizations no longer targeted only 
the mentally impaired, as the criterion expanded to include “unwed mothers, 
prostitutes, petty criminals, and children with disciplinary problems.”26  This 
trend of involuntary sterilizations, however, declined by the end of the 
twentieth century due to “advances in medicine and social science [that] 
increasingly undermined the justifications for the sterilization movement.”27  
However, while Buck v. Bell is technically still good law, subsequent 
Supreme Court rulings indicated a metamorphosis in societal attitude 
towards reproductive freedom. 
A. Distinguishing Buck v. Bell 
Just over a decade after the Buck v. Bell decision was handed down, the 
Supreme Court, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, struck down an Oklahoma law 
requiring compulsory sterilization for persons with more than two 
convictions for felonious offenses to be sterilized.28  While Skinner is often 
credited as the only case to expressly distinguish Buck v. Bell, it did not 
expressly overrule it.29  Although both Skinner and Buck v. Bell address 
compulsory sterilization statutes, analysis in Skinner takes a narrower focus, 
pertaining only to punitive sterilization of criminals and avoids discussion 
on the ethics of forcibly sterilizing the mentally ill.30  Skinner not only 
sidesteps addressing Buck v. Bell by narrowly focusing on punitive 
sterilization, but it also applies a heavier focus on the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31  While Buck v. Bell dismisses Carrie 
Buck’s equal protection contentions,32  Skinner focuses primarily on the 
	  
 23. Phillip Thompson, Silent Protest: A Catholic Justice Dissents in Buck v. Bell, 43 
CATH.  LAW. 125, 130 (2004). 
 24. Scott, supra note 20, at 811. 
 25. Thompson, supra note 23, at 143-44. (noting that during the 1930’s, between two 
thousand to four thousand people were involuntarily sterilized each year). 
 26. Thompson, supra note 23, at 144. 
 27. Thompson, supra note 23, at 144. 
 28. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535-36 (1942). 
 29. Id. at 538. 
 30. Buck v. Bell, 247 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 31. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540-541.  
 32. Id. at 541. 
188 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
equal protection issues presented, and the Court applied a more rigorous 
strict scrutiny test in its analysis of the Oklahoma statute.33 
The Equal Protection Clause is found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. The text reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge any 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.34 
In Skinner, the Oklahoma statute exempted certain offenses, such as 
embezzlement and political offenses, from convictions that would count 
towards punitive sterilization.35   The Supreme Court reasoned that the 
statute’s distinction between different types of felonies allows for a law that 
does not apply equally to a category of people, as it appears to apply only to 
certain types of criminals on an arbitrary and overly subjective basis.36  
Consequently, upholding this law would have essentially allowed the state of 
Oklahoma to deprive its citizens of their reproductive right haphazardly.37  
The Court in Skinner found that by exempting embezzlement but including 
larceny, the law applied unequal legal standards to “those who have 
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense,”38 in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.39  While the Court does comment briefly on the 
lack of procedural protections found in the Oklahoma statute as a violation 
of procedural due process, it refuses the opportunity to analyze the matter, 
suggesting an implied indication of the Supreme Court’s refusal to expressly 
address Buck v. Bell.40 
The Supreme Court limited its focus in Skinner v. Oklahoma to punitive 
sterilization.41 This, along with the decision’s emphasis on equal protection 
claims prove Skinner v. Oklahoma is fairly limited in distinguishing Buck v. 
Bell.  Skinner’s focus on sterilization as punishment separates it from the 
issue of compulsory sterilization statutes in terms of the Court’s originative 
public policy aims, which allowed the Court to rule on Skinner without 
extensively addressing Buck v. Bell. 42   The Skinner Court limits its 
	  
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 34. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537. 
 35. Id. at 538-39. 
 36. Id. at 541. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1942). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 541. 
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comparisons with Buck v. Bell considerably, asserting that because the 
Virginia statute at issue in Buck v. Bell applied to “feeble-minded” 
individuals in relevant institutions of the state, the law was less arbitrary in 
enforcement and covered a relatively discrete class of citizens.43  Through an 
equal protection approach, Skinner manages to avoid addressing underlying 
questions of eugenic intent in legally significant detail.44 
A comprehensive understanding of the evolution of involuntary 
sterilization law following Skinner on a federal level requires an 
appreciation of the societal and legal contexts serving as the background to 
such decisions.  Supreme Court approaches in interpreting the scope of 
many Constitutional protections constantly evolve, accounting for varied 
legal approaches that are often dependent upon trends in jurisprudence most 
dominant at the time of a specific decision.45  Such evolution in legal 
interpretation is particularly evident in examining the history of Supreme 
Court approaches to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.46  Civil 
rights and personal protections under the Fourteenth Amendment have 
grown considerably in protective scope from its addition to the Constitution 
in 1868, both in terms of rights covered, and protective mechanisms.47  Prior 
to the 1930’s, the Supreme Court was reluctant to employ protections under 
the Equal Protection Clause, and instead relied on the Due Process Clause to 
protect personal rights and liberties.48  Buck v. Bell, decided in 1927, is 
reflective of this judicial trend, evident in Justice Holmes’ condemnation of 
the Equal Protection Clause as the “usual last resort of constitutional 
arguments.”49   In the context of the Supreme Court’s shift towards reliance 
on the Equal Protection Clause, it is easier to see, contextually, why the 
Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, decided in 1942, was more inclined to take an 
equal protection approach. 
The effects of World War II and the policies of the German Nazi party 
also account for the reluctance of the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma to 
address the eugenics issues present in compulsory sterilization statutes 
further than a vague reference.  While in Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes 
zealously supported involuntary sterilization as a means of reducing the 
	  
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (where the Court 
acknowledges Buck v. Bell but focuses on the equal protection issue and does not 
mention eugenic policies). 
 45. Dennis J. Hutchinson, A Century of Social Reform: The Judicial Role, 4 THE 
GREEN BAG 2D 157 (2001). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 157, 164. 
 48. Id. at 161; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 49. Hutchinson, supra note 45, at 163. 
190 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
burden of disabled persons on society, it is important to note that these 
words were written in 1927.50  The Virginia statute under scrutiny in Buck v. 
Bell was enacted in 1924.51  It was not until 1933 that Adolf Hitler came to 
power in Germany, and not until 1939 that he used eugenic policies.52  As 
these policies included mass sterilization under similarly worded law, it was 
not until ten years later that these polices were part of the scope of Nazi 
administered genocide and other horrific crimes against humanity.53  Thus, 
Justice Holmes wrote his opinion over a decade before the prime of the Nazi 
regime and the Holocaust, and therefore when eugenic policies did not carry 
such negative and volatile connotations.54  Further, such policy motives had 
many supporters in higher courts, including Justice Holmes himself. 55  
While eugenics was not, at the time of the Buck v. Bell decision, at the 
height of popularity in the scientific community, it had yet to attain the 
public revulsion later acquired in connection with gruesome Nazi policies.56  
Similarly, this historical context explains to a degree why later courts might 
be hesitant to address Holmes’ argument in favor of sterilizing the mentally 
disabled for the overall welfare of society.  Therefore, it follows from this 
context, that the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, faced with a decision 
involving compulsory sterilization in the early 1940’s in the midst of World 
War II, was reluctant to address such an emotionally charged and socially 
divisive issue.57 
	  
 50. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 51. Id. at 205. 
 52. See Nazi Persecution of the Disabled: Murder of the Unfit, U.S. HOLOCAUST 
MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/focus/disabilities/ (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2013). 
 53. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: A New Light on Buck v. 
Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985); see M. Cranach, The Killing of Psychiatric Patients in 
Nazi Germany Between 1939-1945, ISR. J. OF PSYCHIATRY RELATED SCI. 1, 8-18 (2003). 
See also Nazi Persecution of the Disabled: Murder of the Unfit, U.S. HOLOCAUST 
MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/focus/disabilities/ (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2013). During his regime in World War II, Adolf Hitler created mass 
policies ordering the sterilization of classes in his population considering undesirable. 
Included in these policies were the mentally ill as well as the physically and mentally 
disabled. Under these policies, mass sterilization was administered by direction of the 
state, resulting in the sterilization of a large number of disabled persons. 
 54. Thompson, supra note 21, at 142. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Maura McIntyre, Buck v. Bell and Beyond: A Revised Standard to Evaluate the 
Best Interests of the Mentally Disabled in the Sterilization Context, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1303, 1308 (2007).  
 57. Id. at 1308. 
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The reluctance of Skinner and other later courts to address Justice 
Holmes’ eugenics-based argument was not entirely the result of the 
increasingly critical view of eugenics in light of Nazi abuse of sterilization 
law.  Advancements in genetics, medicine, and science further contributed to 
the decline of the eugenics movement,58 which had already been becoming 
more limited in its application even around the time of the Buck v. Bell 
decision.59  It follows naturally, then, in light of such advancements, that 
American society would become less likely to support the sterilization of  
the mentally disabled or ill. 
B. Supreme Court Silence on Compulsory Sterilization 
Since Buck v. Bell and Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court has 
declined to address involuntary sterilization statutes explicitly.  In 
conjunction with substantial scientific advances in medicine and a general 
decline of the eugenics movement, most eugenic sterilization statutes aimed 
at the mentally ill or mentally disabled have since been repealed.60  While, as 
recently as 1988, fourteen states still had eugenic sterilization statutes,61 four 
have since been repealed, and none are currently in active use.62 
Additionally, relevant federal case law over the twentieth century 
indicated a trend towards legal protection of reproductive privacy as a 
fundamental right.63  Modern jurisprudence has indicated a legal trend 
towards analyzing cases where involuntary sterilization is sought within the 
	  
 58. Id. at 1308. See also Eric M. Jaegers, Modern Judicial Treatment of Procreative 
Rights of Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal Rights to Procreation and 
Sterilization, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 947, 951 (1993). 
 59. Thompson, supra note 23, at 125, 142. In 1923, the Supreme Court declined to 
endorse an attempt to use state power designed to “enhance the mental health of [state 
citizens]” in declaring a Nebraska statute preventing public schools from teaching 
German unconstitutional on grounds that this violated due process by limiting 
educational endeavors.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923). 
 60. Scott, supra note 20, at 812 n.18. There were twenty-eight eugenic sterilization 
statutes reported to be law on the state books in 1956, which the states began to repeal in 
the 1960s. By the mid-1980’s most of eugenic sterilization statutes were repealed. 
 61. George P. Smith, Limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the Mentally 
Handicapped, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 71, 77 n.35 (1988). 
 62. Kevlin B. O’Reilly, Confronting Eugenics: Does the Now Discredited Practice 
Have Relevance to Today’s Technology?, AM. MED. NEWS, (July 9, 2007), 
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/07/09/prsa0709.htm. 
 63. Scott, supra note 20, at 813 n. 25. 
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legal framework of the fundamental right to privacy and protection of 
individual reproductive rights.64 
Since statutes concerning sterilization of the mentally incompetent are 
found in state law, the Supreme Court generally declines to address cases of 
involuntary sterilization.65  However, following a mass repeal of eugenics 
era sterilization statutes by many states in the 1960’s and 1970’s, legal 
authority on the issue was unclear in many jurisdictions.66  In many cases, 
states did not provide alternative guidelines after their outdated compulsory 
sterilization laws were repealed, resulting in an absence of statutory 
authority on the matter.67  Though this created a legal grey area following 
the mass repeal of sterilization statutes, as evidenced by 1978’s decision, 
Stump v. Sparkman, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to address 
the substantive legal issues regarding reproductive rights of incompetent 
persons, choosing to leave the decisions to the individual states and focus on 
the limits of judicial immunity in their authority.68  In Stump v. Sparkman, a 
mother had her “somewhat retarded” minor daughter sterilized in 1971 
without the daughter’s knowledge or consent, after obtaining legal approval 
through a petition presented to an Indiana Circuit Court. 69   After the 
daughter later married and could not conceive, she discovered the 
	  
 64. Scott, supra note 20, at 810. Cases involving medical permanent sterilization 
procedures have focused mainly on the right of mentally ill or mentally disabled people 
to privacy and their required consent where parents, guardians, or other legal caregivers 
seek to obtain permanent medical treatments, often sterilization, on their behalf. The right 
of adults who have no such disabilities or illnesses to obtain sterilization has been 
addressed infrequently in the circuits and at the state level, but not by the Supreme Court. 
Presently, sterilization procedures in an involuntary context are generally largely issues 
of guardianship and ability to consent. See generally In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 
(N.J. 1981); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641-642 (Wash. 1980) (en 
banc); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
 65. The last case the Supreme Court addressed involving involuntary sterilization 
was Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), where the Court focused solely on the 
issue of judicial immunity and did not discuss the involuntary sterilization as a legal 
issue. See Beverly Horsburgh, Schrdegreesodinger’s Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory 
Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing 
the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 
531, 569-70 (1996). 
 66. Scott, supra note 20, at 814. See also Christine Ryan, Revisiting Legal Standards 
that Govern Requests to Sterilize Profoundly Incompetent Children: In Light of the 
“Ashley Treatment,” is a New Standard Appropriate?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV 287, 308-09 
(2008). 
 67. Scott, supra note 20, at 810, 814 n.31. 
 68. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361 (1978). 
 69. Id. 
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sterilization and sued the Indiana judge who approved the petition.70  When 
the petition was approved in 1971, there was no statutory authority 
governing sterilization of incompetent persons or minors, and no case law 
existed prohibiting submission and judicial approval of such a petition.71  
Because there was no statute to challenge, the issue to be decided concerned 
the scope of the judge’s judicial immunity in granting the petition, which 
required a judge to have acted within his jurisdiction when claiming 
immunity. .72  The Supreme Court found that because there was no statute or 
prohibitive case law on the matter, the jurisdiction was broad enough to 
include the circuit court judge.73  Though the Supreme Court indicated that 
the judge did err as a matter of law, it declined commentary on sterilization 
laws for incompetent persons.74  Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the 
issue of proper jurisdiction, and ruled that legal error notwithstanding the 
judge had judicial immunity because he was within his jurisdiction to rule on 
the matter .75 
The absence of commentary by the Court on the substance of statutes 
governing the sterilization of minors or incompetent persons indicates the 
Court’s growing unwillingness as the century progressed to address cases 
involving involuntary sterilization on a federal level.76 Comparing this case 
to Buck v. Bell, it is of substantial impact that Justice White did not take the 
opportunity to comment on acceptable societal or individual needs for 
sterilization, as Justice Holmes did in great detail.77  While in Stump v. 
Sparkman there was no actual statute to evaluate, the Court did insinuate that 
it was likely that the judge did not extend procedural due process to the 
woman in question whereas Buck v. Bell discussed an existing Virginia 
statute. 78  The Supreme Court declined an opportunity to comment on the 
issues a violation of procedural due process might present and the interests a 
judge should consider in evaluating a petition. This, along with the strict 
	  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 358. 
 72. Id. at 354-55. 
 73. Id. at 359-60. 
 74. See Horsburgh, supra note 65 at 569-70. 
 75. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1978). 
 76. Horsburgh, supra note 65, at 570. 
 77. Compare Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356-60 (where Justice White focuses on judicial 
immunity), with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207-08 (where Justice Holmes engages in a 
lengthy discussion about the ethical implications of compulsory sterilization as a societal 
good). 
 78. Id. They insinuated potential violation of the sterilized woman’s right to due 
process in making their point that such a violation does not, if made in the appropriate 
jurisdiction, violate judicial immunity. 
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focus on judicial immunity, indicates that the Supreme Court’s approach 
shifted to decline federal interpretation in regard to sterilization policies. 
C. Shift Towards Expansion of the Right to Privacy 
Simultaneously, with its silence on compulsory sterilization law as state 
legislatures repealed their eugenic sterilization statutes en masse, the 
Supreme Court released a series of decisions that confirmed both the 
existence and protection of a fundamental right to privacy in a number of 
areas. 79   Over the past century, the Supreme Court has expanded 
fundamental rights through an interpretation of the Constitution to include 
rights not explicitly stated in the text, but found in the penumbra of specific 
protections stated in the Bill of Rights. 80   Through this interpretative 
approach, the Supreme Court found privacy to be a fundamental right 
subject to Constitutional protection, even though privacy is not directly 
mentioned in the text.81  This fundamental right to privacy was expanded to 
protect many reproductive rights, including marriage, contraception, 
termination of pregnancy, and procreation.82  Over the latter half of the 
twentieth century, this expansion of the right to privacy led to the 
development of the constitutional right to reproductive privacy and now 
requires a revision of the analytical approach used in assessing the 
constitutionality of laws governing sterilization of the incompetent.83 
Continuing the legal trend expanding protections under the right to 
privacy, the Supreme Court declared a statute prohibiting use by or 
distribution of contraception to married couples unconstitutional because it 
violated the fundamental right to privacy in the 1965 decision Griswold v. 
Connecticut.84   Holding that the guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbra inclusive of the right to privacy, the Court found that the 
	  
 79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 208. See Scott, 
supra note 20, at 811. 
 80. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 81. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
 82. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (where the court recognized the right to privacy extends 
to a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, though this right is not unlimited); 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485  (where the court extended the right to privacy to reproductive 
decisions within marriage, striking down a Connecticut law withholding contraceptives 
from marriage); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (where the court extends 
the ruling from Griswold to apply also to unmarried couples, including the right to 
contraceptives as within the right to privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(where the court extended the right to privacy to include the right to marriage, striking 
down a state law prohibiting interracial marriage). 
 83. Scott, supra note 20, at 811 n.17. 
 84. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
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Connecticut statute improperly regulated marriage, a “relationship within the 
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”85  
In 1972, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird expanded that holding to 
encompass unmarried persons, reasoning that such an expansion was 
necessary on equal protection grounds.86 
In perhaps the most recognizable right to privacy case, the controversial 
1972 decision in Roe v. Wade determined that the fundamental right to 
privacy extends to protect a woman’s decision to end a pregnancy. 87  
According to the Court’s reasoning, the right to this specific privacy extends 
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty, which reads, “nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property.”88  The Court, 
however, acknowledged some acceptable limitations on the right to end a 
pregnancy, including when a state’s interests in “safeguarding health, in 
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life . . . become 
sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the . . 
. decision.”89  The decision in Roe v. Wade invalidated the Texas  state law 
prohibiting all abortions outright.90  Following Roe, numerous state and 
federal courts struck down abortion statutes as unconstitutional violations of 
a woman’s right to privacy.91 
Since the Court in Roe, Griswold, and Eisenstadt determined the freedom 
to terminate a pregnancy and to access contraception are fundamental rights, 
state laws imposing limitations on such rights are subject to strict scrutiny 
under judicial review.92  Under the strict scrutiny analysis, any law limiting a 
fundamental right is unconstitutional unless it serves a compelling state 
interest to which the legislation is narrowly tailored to address.93  Legal 
classifications of reproductive rights as fundamental under the right to 
privacy casts Buck v. Bell in a new light.94  When Buck v. Bell was decided 
in 1927, reproductive autonomy was not yet afforded its more recent 
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protections as a fundamental right.  Furthermore, case law developing 
standards of heightened scrutiny under judicial review was not introduced 
until 1938,95 or fully articulated by the court until 1944.96  As a legal 
framework for considering violations of equal protection or due process, 
strict scrutiny as a standard was not applied in case law until 1967.97  
Therefore, in understanding Buck v. Bell, it is important to note that because 
case law had yet to develop higher standards of scrutiny, any equal 
protection analysis by Justice Holmes was limited to the only standard of 
review available, the rational basis test.98 
II. STATE STANDARDS FOR STERILIZATION 
“Currently, courts adopt one of three rules to determine whether to grant a 
petition for sterilization of any individual deemed incompetent for the 
purpose of giving informed consent to the procedure: (i) the substituted 
judgment standard, (ii) the minority criteria rule, or (iii) the discretionary 
best interest standard.”99  These standards are based on rulings found in case 
law, and evolved from “selectively adopting case law of other similarly 
situated states’.” 100   Therefore, outcomes in such cases have become 
unpredictable.101  The variability of these outcomes is not restricted to the 
discrepancies between varied state statutes, as outcomes can differ on similar 
cases within one jurisdiction alone.102 
Despite the varied objectives evident in the approaches taken by the three 
rules, all require extensive procedural legwork103 creating strict standards 
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and placing the odds strongly against sterilization.104  These state-level cases 
requiring extensive procedural legwork are decided similarly to that in Buck 
v. Bell, as the focus is not on the existence of procedural protections for the 
rights of the mentally impaired person, but instead on the adequacy of such 
procedures and their enforcement.105  Challenges to sterilization provisions 
addressing substantive issues arising from the content or intent of the 
statutes, as addressed to some extent in Buck v. Bell,106 have not since been 
addressed on a federal level.  This, perhaps, is illustrative of why varied 
standards have evolved to produce fairly unpredictable results.  While the 
justifications of modern state standards are generally tailored to reflect the 
best interests of the incompetent person, this presents a broad arena for 
interpretation, leading to such variable outcomes.107 
A. Substituted Judgment Standard 
The substituted judgment standard seeks to preserve fundamental liberties 
by assigning a surrogate to an incompetent person and “[allowing] a court to 
render a decision consistent with the decision the patient would have made if 
capable.”108  This standard originated in case law in 1976, when the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan allowed the guardian of a patient in a 
permanent unconscious state to exercise the right to decline potentially 
lifesaving medical procedures on behalf of the patient.109  In order to protect 
the constitutional right to decline lifesaving medical procedures, the father of 
a permanently incompetent woman was permitted to decide whether or not 
to sustain life support.110  While many states subsequently adopted this 
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approach, 111  the New Jersey court in In re Grady declined to extend 
application of the doctrine to involuntary sterilization of the mentally 
incompetent.112 
In Grady, the parents of Lee Ann Grady, a 19-year-old girl born with 
Down Syndrome, brought the case after Morristown Memorial Hospital 
refused an operation sterilizing their daughter.113  Lee Ann’s inability to 
significantly comprehend the consequences of sexual relationships or 
pregnancy or care for a child was undisputed.114  Additionally, it was 
uncontroverted that Lee Ann was likely to require “lifetime supervision to 
care for her own needs.”115  Recognizing her limitations, Lee Ann’s parents’ 
long-term plan was to place her in a group home for mentally retarded 
adults, but only if they could ensure Lee Ann would not accidentally 
conceive.116 
After the hospital in Grady refused to perform the sterilization without 
court authorization, Lee Ann’s parents filed a complaint and subsequently, 
the trial judge assigned a guardian ad litem to represent Lee Ann in judicial 
proceedings.117 During this time, Lee Ann also underwent medical and 
psychological expert evaluations. 118   After considering testimony from 
involved persons and experts, analyzing evaluative reports, and meeting with 
Lee Ann herself, the trial judge created a five-part standard for determining 
whether or not the court should authorize sterilization.119 The trial court’s 
standard addressed the extent of the individual’s incompetency, the best 
interests of the incompetent with respect to reproductive choices, and the 
application of procedural safeguards as stipulated by the statute. 120  
Concluding that Lee Ann met the conditions imposed by this standard, the 
trial judge authorized the sterilization.121   However, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey later rejected the lower court’s five-part standard stating that it 
allowed for potential judicial abuse; and therefore imposed a modified 
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version of the trial court’s standard that included a stricter set of 
requirements.122 
In Grady, the higher court modified and supplemented the trial court’s 
standard, first, by determining that it is the duty of the court, not the parents, 
to decide whether or not sterilization is necessary.123  After endorsing the 
trial court’s procedures in reaching the previous standard,124 it ruled that “the 
trial judge must find that the individual lacks capacity to make a decision 
about sterilization and that the incapacity is not likely to change in the 
foreseeable future.”125   Finally, considering a non-exhaustive list of factors 
which include the possibility of pregnancy, likelihood of sexual activity, 
feasibility of less permanent contraceptive methods, the person’s 
understanding of the reproductive process, and overall ability to provide 
adequate childcare,126 the standard required a finding that there is “clear and 
convincing proof that sterilization is in the incompetent person’s best 
interests.”127  Applying these standards, the New Jersey Supreme Court was 
unable to conclude that sterilization was within Lee Ann’s best interest.128  
Instead, the court held that sterilization was premature because there was no 
reasonable likelihood of Lee Ann becoming sexually active in the near 
future.129 
Though the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the substituted judgment 
standard, other states do employ this approach. Through In re Moe, a case 
concerning a severely mentally retarded adult woman, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court implemented the substituted judgment standard rejected in 
Grady.130  The court in Moe first set down procedural safeguards uniform to 
all sterilization standards, which required appointing a guardian ad litem, 
evaluations by medical and psychological experts, and a declaration that the 
person was legally incompetent to make reproductive decisions.131   In 
accordance with the substituted judgment approach, the judge must, based 
on the evidence from the expert reports and guardian ad litem, “attempt to 
ascertain the ward’s actual preference for sterilization, parenthood, or other 
means of contraception . . . [to arrive at] the same decision that would be 
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made by the incompetent person.”132  Essentially, the substituted judgment 
standard attempts to work within the procedural framework to ascertain the 
wishes of an incompetent person. 
Supporters of substituted judgment standard contend that this standard 
best incorporates the wishes of the incompetent individual into the ultimate 
determination.133  While they do concede that the standard may allow for 
unwise decisions, they argue that this equalizes the incompetent with the 
competent, since competent people are generally held to imprudent decisions 
without judgment.134  Conversely, critics find the standard to be logically 
flawed because it asks the decision maker to ascertain what the incompetent 
person would choose if competent.135  This logical fallacy is therefore 
thought to be dangerous in that it essentially asks the decision maker to 
decide from the viewpoint of someone who was never competent 
originally.136  No matter how the decision maker decides,  it is impossible to 
ensure that they reached the same decision that the mentally impaired person 
would have reached were they able to choose for themselves, implying a 
strong possibility that the decision rendered is not in the impaired 
individual’s best interest.137  Finally, since there is no way to fully remove 
the personal beliefs or preferences of the surrogate decision maker from the 
equation, accuracy cannot be ensured.138 
The substituted judgment standard presents practical complications with 
reference to differentiating between those who became incompetent after 
living competently for some time, and those who have never experienced 
competency. 139   While most cases dealing with the sterilization of 
incompetent persons concern those who are born with profound mental 
disabilities,140 cases do arise concerning sterilization of persons who later 
became incompetent by means of brain damage or severe mental illness.141 
The difficulty in reconciling substituted judgment standards for persons who 
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have never been  competent with the formerly competent contributes to the 
reluctance of many courts to adopt such standards.142 
B. Mandatory Criteria Rule 
In 1980, Washington State created the mandatory criteria approach in 
their landmark decision In re Guardianship of Hayes.143  The facts in Hayes 
are similar to those in Grady, where the parents of a 19-year-old woman 
with Down Syndrome sought to obtain a sterilization for their daughter.144  
The mother of Edith Hayes, a severely mentally retarded sixteen-year-old, 
petitioned the Superior Court of Washington to authorize Edith’s 
sterilization145  Edith, though physically developed normally and capable of 
conception, “function[ed] at the level of a 4- or 5-year-old.”146 Though Edith 
was alleged to be sexually active, she did not have the mental  capacity to 
logically connect sexual activity with her reproductive capacity.147 
The Washington Supreme Court first discusses relevant factors in 
sterilization decisions before setting down its own procedural guidelines for 
authorizing sterilizations. 148   After emphasizing the seriousness and 
permanence of sterilization procedures,149 the court finds that sterilization 
can occasionally be in the best interest of an incompetent person. 150   
However, the procedural framework is rigid: 
The decision can only be made in a superior court proceeding in 
which (1) the incompetent individual is represented by a 
disinterested guardian ad litem, (2) the court has received 
independent advice based on a comprehensive medical, 
psychological, and social evaluation of the individual, and (3) to 
the greatest extent possible, the court has elicited and taken into 
account the view of the incompetent individual.151 
Following this framework, “the judge must first find by clear, cogent and 
convincing evidence that the individual is (1) incapable of making his or her 
own decision about sterilization, and (2) unlikely to develop sufficiently to 
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make an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable future.”152  
Additionally, the petitioner for sterilization must prove a demonstrated need 
for contraception exists.153  Sterilization is granted only if sterilization is the 
only contraceptive option.154  While the court in Hayes recognized the 
stringency of their required burden of proof,155 they found Edith did not 
meet their requirements for sterilization. Specifically, no sufficient evidence 
proved conclusively that sterilization was the only feasible form of 
contraception, or that Edith would categorically be incapable of good 
parenting.156 
Advocates of the mandatory criteria approach argue the standard’s 
stringency is a protective advantage because it allows minimal exercise of 
judicial discretion.157  Advocates also contend its inflexibility protects an 
incompetent person’s privacy interests from arbitrary and unfair outcomes 
that might result under broader judicial discretion.158  Furthermore, because 
the guidelines do not require balancing an indeterminate list of factors, their 
rigidity and clarity make them easier in application and setting precedents.159 
Conversely, opponents find that inflexibility of the standard essentially 
provides courts a mechanism to deny sterilization petitions without deeper 
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inquiry into the specifics of an individual’s case.160  Critics also contend that 
this standard may not be in the best interest of the incompetent.161  If a judge 
finds that a case may not satisfy a requirement less relevant to the persons’ 
best interest, they may be forced to disregard other factors potentially more 
impactful on an individual’s well-being.162 Additionally, from a right to 
privacy standpoint, the standard’s strong presumption against sterilization 
places such importance on the right to procreate that it ignores the 
importance of the companion’s right not to procreate.163 
C. Discretionary Best Interest Standard 
The case of In re Terwilliger involved a legal guardian’s petition to 
declare their ward incompetent and to have her involuntary sterilized.164  
Mildred Terwilliger, described as mentally deficient,165 was illiterate at age 
25, and gave birth to an illegitimate child shortly before trial proceedings 
began.166  Mildred did not take responsibility for her child, who was under 
the care of her parents.167  The court ruled that there was no applicable 
statute at the time in Pennsylvania,168 and therefore it created a standard 
beginning with procedural safeguards similar to those of Hayes and 
Grady.169  Procedurally, the judge must first appoint a guardian ad litem to 
advocate on behalf of the individual subject to the competency hearing.170  
The court also requires the individual to undergo a “comprehensive medical, 
psychological, and social evaluation.”171  The trial judge must meet with the 
incompetent person to determine if their presence is required at the hearing, 
where they must formulate an impression regarding their competency, and 
then decide accordingly.172 
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Following the competency hearing, the judge must make a number of 
procedural findings.173  First, the judge must find “that the individual lacks 
capacity to make a decision about sterilization and that the incapacity is not 
likely to change in the foreseeable future.”174  Furthermore, the judge must 
also find that the incompetent individual has the ability to reproduce and that 
sterilization is the only reasonable method of contraception.175  Once the 
above findings are made, the court will then determine if sterilization is in 
the best interest of the incompetent individual. 176  To make this 
determination, the Terwilliger court adopts the factors employed by the 
Grady court.177  With regard to Mildred Terwilliger, the Terwilliger Court 
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procedure. (7) The ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the 
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with a spouse, care for a child. (8) Evidence that scientific or medical advances 
may occur within the foreseeable future which will make possible either 
improvement of the individual’s condition or alternative and less drastic 
sterilization procedures. (9) A demonstration that the proponents of sterilization 
are seeking it in good faith and that their primary concern is for the best 
interests of the incompetent person rather than their own or the public’s 
convenience. These factors should each be given appropriate weight as the 
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concurred with testimony given by Mildred’s father, family physician, and 
Mildred herself indicated that Mildred lacked capacity to make her own 
reproductive decisions.178 Furthermore, it is implied the Terwilliger court 
recognized that Mildred’s inability to care for her illegitimate child without 
aid from professionals and family proved that she did not understand the 
consequences of sexual activity.179  However, upon review of testimony 
given by Mildred’s family physician, which indicated that birth control 
mechanisms less drastic than sterilization may have sufficed,180 the court 
found that the standard requiring sterilization to be the only feasible option 
was not met and vacated the decision of the lower court, ordering a 
remand.181 
Advocates of the discretionary best interest analysis find the standard’s 
flexibility advantageous, as the judges are granted wide discretion with their 
decisions.182  This flexibility and broad discretion essentially forces judges 
to consider the specific facts of each case so that their decision is 
individually tailored to each unique situation.  However, opponents of the 
discretionary best interest standard find the flexibility as potentially 
misleading in terms of precedent, as broad judicial discretion in such context 
will “inevitably lead to inconsistent results.”183 
D. Policy Considerations in State Law 
Recent case law indicates that state standards providing for sterilization of 
incompetent persons have developed uniformly to attend to the best interest 
of the profoundly mentally disabled, and no longer established under 
eugenic justifications.184  The differing approaches of varied state standards, 
however, do reflect a legal uncertainty in light of the Supreme Court’s 
silence on matters involving involuntary sterilization since Buck v. Bell and 
Skinner v. Oklahoma.185  However, from a policy perspective, the state laws 
regarding sterilization of incompetent or mentally disabled persons are 
unvarying in their condemnation of eugenic sterilization and their assertion 
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of the intent to act in the best interest of the individual at issue. 186 
Additionally, since the rulings in most cases were decided following the 
expansion of reproductive privacy as a fundamental right under the right to 
privacy, most state decisions reflect reluctance to infringe on this right 
through their standards. 
The Court in Hayes acknowledges the influence of the eugenic movement 
in early sterilization laws, and while it addresses the possibility that eugenic 
sterilization may be constitutional, it also emphasizes the scientific 
advancements subsequent to Buck v. Bell that disprove such theories.187  The 
Court’s contention is that this removes any legitimate basis for arguments 
supportive of improving society with eugenic sterilization laws.188  Its policy 
concern is, instead, in regards to the best interest of the incompetent person, 
and not the needs of society overall.189  In that respect, the Court recognizes 
the unique complications the sterilization decision presents, in that unlike 
with most other medical procedures, there is no guarantee that the child and 
parent would share the same interest.190  In light of this recognition, the 
Hayes court sees this as an example of an instance where it may be 
necessary to distinguish the interests of mentally disabled persons from 
those of a minor child in terms of sterilization law.191  For this reason, it 
confines authorization of these procedures to the courts, declining to allow 
guardians to consent to the sterilization in the same way they would for 
many other procedures.192  The standard is a stringent reflection of the 
Court’s reluctance to infringe on the right to privacy, granting the procedure 
in the rare cases where it finds the most conclusive proof sterilization is in 
the best interest of a particular incompetent person.193 
Similarly, the court in Grady recognizes the history of abuse manifested in 
the sterilization of incompetent persons prior to the decline of the eugenics 
movement.194 Consequently, the Grady court expresses its intent to decide 
instead in favor of the best interests of the incompetent.195 In light of this 
recognition, Grady distinguishes the guidelines for sterilization from the 
compulsory sterilization law of the past by redefining the classification of 
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incompetent persons in accordance with the law.196 Refusing to classify 
sterilization of incompetent persons as either voluntary or involuntary, the 
Grady court creates a new category tailored to those who cannot consent for 
the purposes of developing their legal standards. 197  Additionally, it 
recognizes the constitutional right to privacy inherent in such issues, and 
extends this right to privacy to expressly include the right to obtain 
sterilization.198  This provides citizens of their state extended protection 
under the fundamental right to privacy, which does not specifically include 
sterilization under Supreme Court precedent.199 
In development of the discretionary best interest approach, the court in 
Terwilliger also appreciates the gravity of sterilization as a procedure in 
respect to permanence and intrusion on their right to privacy.200 Its analysis 
differs slightly from Hayes and Grady in creating its respective approaches 
through its focus on proper jurisdiction and employment of the doctrine of 
parens patriae to decide on matters of sterilization.201  The doctrine of 
parens patriae, which authorizes the state to made decisions in the place of 
guardians in certain situations, is here extended to include sterilization of 
incompetent persons.202 In reservation of its rights of parens patriae on such 
matters, the decision emphatically accentuates the obligations of the courts 
to act with solely the best interest of the incompetent person in mind.203 
E. State Level Implications on Buck v. Bell 
Following Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court’s expansion of right to privacy 
protections and societal shifts in public policy presented interesting 
analytical implications for modern developments of state sterilization 
standards. In some respects, recent case law reflects an adherence to the 
rationale of Buck v. Bell, though it is fairly limited to maintaining strong 
enforcement of procedural due process rights. The Virginia statute at issue in 
Buck v. Bell remained in force because it provided procedural mechanisms 
safeguarding due process rights.204 With respect to judicial emphasis on 
ensuring the protections of procedural due process, standards developed in 
state case law included similarly strong procedural requirements, intended to 
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afford parallel protections.205 The mandatory criteria standard developed in 
the Hayes opinion limits decisions concerning involuntary sterilization to 
remain within the scope of court supervision.206 Additionally, the procedural 
requirements in Hayes also include appointment of a guardian ad litem, 
evaluations of the person by medical, social, and psychological experts, 
reports on such evaluations, and efforts to obtain the viewpoint of the 
incompetent as best possible.207 
Similarly, Grady also requires appointing a guardian ad litem and various 
expert evaluations of the incompetent person, in addition to a court hearing 
and requirement that the judge meet with the allegedly incompetent 
person.208 The standard developed in Terwilliger echoes this procedural 
approach, including an express requirement of due notice along with 
appointment of a guardian, evaluations, and court hearing. 209  Similar 
requirements for court hearings, guardian, and expert evaluations are also 
found in the substituted judgment standard as adapted by the court in Moe.210 
Though state courts follow Buck v. Bell closely in terms of ensuring 
procedural safeguards, a clear deviation emerges in terms of the policy 
driving court rationale, and the standards of scrutiny employed for purposes 
of judicial review. The 1924 Virginia statute was drafted for the purpose of 
improving society through eugenic methods,211  and relevant substantive 
discussion in Buck v. Bell accepted, to an extent, such motivations.212 Since 
many states started to repeal their eugenic sterilization laws enacted around 
or following the Buck v. Bell decision beginning in the 1960’s and 
continuing through the 1980’s,213 more recent state law indicated a divergent 
trend in the underlying policy for authorizing compulsory sterilization. Court 
opinions specified a shift in their chief concerns away from general societal 
welfare, and towards acting in the best interest of the incompetent person.214 
This shift from an emphasis on overall societal welfare to protection of 
individual privacy is further evident through the identity of the petitioners 
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seeking the sterilization.  In Buck v. Bell and Skinner v. Oklahoma, state 
actors sought the sterilization of incompetent persons, respectively the 
Virginia mental institutions and the Oklahoma legislature.215  In more recent 
state cases like Hayes and Grady, the facts concerned involve the family 
members or guardians of the incompetent person seeking sterilization.216   
This indicates that the policies are better applicable to individual liberties 
and allow for a stronger focus onto sterilization as in the best interest. 
In conjunction with the expansion of the right to privacy, developments 
post Buck v. Bell with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of substantive due 
process allowed the states less leniency in laws that could potentially abridge 
newly protected personal rights.217  Judge Holmes evaluated the substantive 
due process claim in Buck v. Bell under the rational basis test,218 which 
required only proof that the law could rationally relate to a legitimate 
government interest.219  The Supreme Court has since required heightened 
scrutiny in cases where a law would infringe on what is deemed to be a 
fundamental right.220  By the time many state courts developed the current 
standards for sterilization of incompetent persons, the Supreme Court had 
extended the right to privacy to include procreation as a fundamental 
right.221  Since any law infringing on a fundamental right may only be 
upheld if they are “narrowly drawn” to serve a “compelling state interest,”222 
more recent sterilization laws were held to a higher standard of scrutiny than 
the Virginia statute at issue in Buck v. Bell. 223   It was therefore a 
combination of the heightened scrutiny and expansion of fundamental rights 
that accounted for the deviation of modern case law from the Buck v. Bell 
approach to an analysis of substantive due process claims. 
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III. MARY MOE AND THE MODERN BACKLASH 
The most recent court decision regarding involuntary sterilization 
concerned the pregnancy of a severely mentally ill thirty-two-year old 
woman, referred to in court documents as “Mary Moe” for the purposes of 
confidentiality. 224   As previously indicated, since the 1982 In re Moe 
decision, Massachusetts has followed the substituted judgment approach 
when authorizing sterilization.225   In applying the substituted judgment 
approach, “[t]he court ‘dons the mental mantle of the incompetent’ and 
substitutes itself as nearly as possible for the individual in the decision 
making process.”226 
A. The Trial Court Decision and Sterilization Order 
The facts of the case indicate that Mary Moe, a schizophrenic, suffers 
from bipolar mood disorder.227  Prior to the events outlined, Mary Moe “has 
been pregnant twice before.”228  The first pregnancy was terminated, and the 
second resulted in the birth of a boy who is in the custody of Mary Moe’s 
parents.229  Mary Moe made a number of erroneous and erratic statements at 
a competency hearing on December 9, 2011.230  She denied being pregnant 
and claimed to have previously met the judge, who stated that she and Moe 
have never met.231  Moe also claimed to be a devout Catholic and opposed to 
abortion, asserting that she would never have one.232  The parents of Moe, 
conversely, “have stated that [Moe] is not an ‘active’ Catholic.” 233  
Following this hearing, Judge Christina L. Harms, then of the Massachusetts 
Probate and Family Court found Moe to be severely delusional and thus 
“incompetent to make a decision about an abortion.”234 
Judge Harms appointed a guardian to prepare an investigative report on 
Moe’s condition, focusing on the issue of substituted judgment as set out in 
Massachusetts law under ALM GL ch. 190B § 5-306A.235  This statute 
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prevents guardians of minor children or incompetent persons from 
consenting on their behalf to treatment plans unless the court both finds in 
applying the substituted judgment standard that the person would consent if 
competent, and expressly approves that specific treatment or procedure.236 
Furthermore, under the substituted judgment standard the statute requires the 
court to hold a hearing before authorizing any treatment.237 
In the course of this investigation, the guardian consulted a doctor about 
possible risks posed to the fetus presented by Mary Moe’s schizophrenia 
medication.238  According to the report, Mary Moe was recommended to 
discontinue use of her medication as it would harm unborn children.239 
While Judge Harms weighed all relevant factors to determine how Mary 
Moe would choose to proceed with the pregnancy if competent, in applying 
the substituted judgment standard, she found the discontinuation of some of 
Mary Moe’s antipsychotic medication to prevent harming the fetus to be the 
most compelling factor.240  In an open letter later published in a Boston area 
legal journal,241  Judge Harms explained: 
As Probate and Family Court judges, we deal regularly with 
mental health issues, and know that people with untreated or 
poorly controlled schizophrenia commit suicide at far greater rates 
than the rest of the population.  That Mary Moe’s pregnancy and 
resultant medication reduction puts her at substantial risk of killing 
or harming herself in the coming months seemed important to me. 
I formed the judgment that religion would be a lesser 
consideration for Mary Moe than her own safety and well-being.  I 
viewed the interruption of Mary’s full medicinal regimen as 
potentially life-threatening. If Mary understood this, which my 
observation of her behavior, demeanor, and responses indicated 
that she did not, I believed then, as I do now, that she would elect 
to abort the pregnancy in order to protect her own well-being.242 
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Thus, because removing Mary Moe from her medication could have grim 
consequences to her health, Judge Harms ruled that had Mary Moe been able 
to understand such consequences, she would have elected to terminate the 
pregnancy and agree to sterilization.243  Under this application, Judge Harms 
employed the Massachusetts substituted judgment standard requiring Mary 
Moe to obtain an abortion and undergo compulsory sterilization.244 
B. Appellate Response and Media Firestorm 
Following the decision of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court, 
the case of Mary Moe went before the Massachusetts Appeals Court.245  
Here, the appellate court agreed with the Probate and Family Court that the 
substituted judgment approach was the correct standard, but disagreed with 
Judge Harms’ application. 246   According to the Appeals Court, the 
substituted judgment standard requires a determination of how the person 
would decide if competent, and does not consider what decision would 
actually be in the best interest of that individual.247  On these grounds, the 
Appeals Court stressed the importance of the “actual preference” of Mary 
Moe on the matter, and in finding that Mary Moe was consistent in her 
refusal to undergo an abortion, concluded that she would refuse an abortion 
if not incompetent.248  In light of that determination, the Appeals Court 
remanded in part with regards to the abortion order and reversed in part in 
terms of the sterilization order.249  In reversing the sterilization order, the 
Appeals Court contended that because the order was authorized in 
conjunction with the abortion directive, Mary Moe was denied due process 
as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.250 
Shortly after the appellate ruling, the case of Mary Moe attracted the 
attention of various advocacy groups and politicians, inciting a media 
firestorm.251  The story ran in local news outlets like the Boston Globe as 
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well as national news services like NBC and Associated Press.252  The press 
coverage caught the attention of the legal community on the internet when 
the case was featured on a well-known legal blog, Above The Law.253  As 
the story gained popularity on the internet, entertainment blogs published 
dramatized accounts of the case online.  For example, written specifically for 
its largely female audience, the blog Jezebel, owned by Gawker Media, 
published a particularly dramatic and inflammatory piece on the Mary Moe 
incident entitled, “Horrible Judge Tries to Force Schizophrenic Woman to 
Get Abortion, Be Sterilized.”254 
In an open letter published following the media backlash, Judge Harms 
defended her decision to order the abortion and sterilization.255  Along with 
addressing her focus on Mary Moe’s safety and well-being, Judge Harms 
contended that, aside from ruling with regard to Mary Moe’s best interest, 
her reasoning did follow the standard of substituted judgment.256  In defense 
of her substituted judgment analysis, Judge Harms wrote: 
Apart from being life-threatening, schizophrenia is probably the 
most devastating among all the mental illnesses, in terms of human 
suffering.  As we know, people with untreated or poorly controlled 
schizophrenia often stop bathing, shaving, washing their hair, 
wearing shoes, and using toilets to urinate or defecate. The right 
combination of medications ameliorates these common symptoms, 
often to a remarkable degree, sometimes to at least a satisfactory 
degree.  If Mary Moe’s schizophrenia may worsen to the point that 
she suffers from some or all of these common symptoms, what 
would be her substituted judgment?257 
Following her defense of her application of the substituted judgment 
standard in the Mary Moe case, Judge Harms continued her letter to address 
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the contention that she had failed to provide due process, explaining that 
there had in fact been a hearing where Mary Moe was present.258 
In light of the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court and the 
statements of Judge Harms, the issues here are illustrative of the long-
standing emphasis on ensuring enforcement of procedural protections as 
afforded by due process rights.  The focal point of the appellate ruling 
focused on the affordance of the procedural protections of the Massachusetts 
standard, which included the requirement of considering the actual 
preference of the incompetent and either a evidentiary hearing or judicial 
findings based on documented evidence,259 as actually applied to Mary 
Moe.260  This is evident in their focus on Judge Harm’s assessment of Mary 
Moe’s opposition to terminating her pregnancy or undergoing sterilization 
on religious grounds in adherence of Catholic dogma.261  Contending that 
the Judge did not hold a hearing and disregarded Mary Moe’s opposition to 
abortion by way of Catholic belief, 262  the appellate court found that 
inadequate efforts to ascertain actual preference indicated that Mary Moe 
was not afforded full procedural protection.263  This scrutiny of procedural 
safeguards indicates a continuation of the emphasis on safeguarding 
protections of procedural due process. 
IV. LEGACY OF PRECEDENT IN BUCK V. BELL 
The following analysis addresses the separate focus on personal rights 
under procedural and substantive due process.  This analysis shows a 
steadfast adherence towards the enforcement of procedural safeguards on 
due process.  Additionally, this discussion examines the impact of later 
standards for evaluation of substantive due process rights, affording 
sterilization laws higher levels of scrutiny not yet available under Buck v. 
Bell. 
A. Inclusion of Due Process Rights as Binding Authority 
In large part, the Buck v. Bell decision focused on the compliance of the 
Virginia statute with procedural due process requirements as set out by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.264   To refresh, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment states that: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of 
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”265  Satisfaction of 
procedural due process generally requires legal safeguards such as 
mandatory hearings and notification to be included in statutes governing the 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.266  Therefore it is important to note 
that in drafting the Virginia statute at issue in Buck v. Bell, lawmakers 
crafted the legislation with an active effort to include procedural safeguards 
that would comport with the requirements imposed by due process.267  The 
statute itself required that in order to impose compulsory sterilization on an 
inmate of a qualifying state institution, a petition must be filed with a board 
specially created to review such cases, and the incompetent person to be 
sterilized must be notified, appointed a guardian, and afforded a hearing and 
opportunity to appeal.268 
Justice Holmes found the requirement of procedural due process 
satisfactory in Buck v. Bell in light of such safeguards designed to address 
the rights of Carrie Buck and other patients at such institutions before 
depriving her of her reproductive liberty through administering the 
involuntary sterilization.269  Since Carrie Buck had been actually afforded 
every procedural protection as required by the statute, the court found that 
her legal right to due process had not been violated.270  This part of the 
opinion is expressly binding, in light of later interpretation of sterilization 
law at the state level.  In the more recent January 2012 decision in 
Guardianship of Moe, the opinion of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals 
was entirely concerned with ensuring that Mary Moe was afforded her full 
procedural rights under state statute in ordering her sterilization, and did not 
address in detail the substantive elements of the Massachusetts substituted 
judgment standard from an analytical perspective of the standard itself.271 
Since the court found that because the judge did not hold the mandatory 
hearing or provide the necessary alternative evidence, and ordered the 
sterilization without adequate notice, Mary Moe did not receive the 
procedural protections afforded to her by law.272  On these grounds, they 
found that the due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment was 
not provided, and overruled the sterilization order.273  The focus on ensuring 
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receipt of the full protections as required under the due process clause in 
Guardianship of Moe indicates that the stipulation in Buck v. Bell that 
requires involuntary sterilization statutes to include and exercise such 
procedural protections is binding law. 
Conversely, it is much harder to argue that the Buck v. Bell approach to 
substantive due process is binding authority, in light of subsequent evolution 
of the standards of judicial review and protections under the right to privacy. 
As discussed in greater detail in Part II, Buck v. Bell was decided in 1927, 
decades before the courts classified reproductive autonomy as a fundamental 
right,274 and before the development and adaptation of heightened standards 
of judicial review.275  At the time, the only standard for judicial review of 
law with regard to substantive due process issues was the rational basis test, 
which requires that the statute or regulation be somehow related to a 
legitimate government interest.276  It is important to note that rational basis 
only requires that the law be potentially supportive of any legitimate 
government interest.277  Note that the rational test basis does not mandate 
that the interest cited be an actual interest of the government, nor does it 
require proof that the legislation was created with that interest in mind.278  In 
applying this standard, Justice Holmes’ contention indicates the view that 
there is a legitimate state interest in reducing the burden of incompetent 
persons on government resources. 279   Though the legislative intent of 
lawmakers indicates that the sterilization statute could reflect such an 
interest,280 this does not mean that Justice Holmes’ support for eugenicist 
policies as a legitimate government interest is immortalized as binding 
authority.  In fact, one recent scholar acknowledged the difficulty that 
modern courts would face if they would attempt to use Buck v. Bell to 
establish eugenic sterilization as a legitimate state interest, specifically in 
cases involving hereditary genetic defects.281 
Rather, the strong presumption against such drastic measures seems to 
indicate that Justice Holmes’ recognition of eugenic sterilization as a 
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legitimate government interest is dicta. A close reading of his argument 
reveals that his application of the Virginia law to the potential interest of 
societal improvement through eugenic sterilization is vague.  Holmes wrote, 
in regards to that interest, “we cannot say as a matter of law that the grounds 
do not exist, and if they exist they justify the result.”282 
B. Impact of Dicta in Buck v. Bell Analysis of Substantive Due Process 
1. Dicta Generally 
While there is no conclusive authority or standard for guiding distinction 
between dicta and holding,283 dicta is traditionally defined to characterize 
judicial statements “not necessary to the decision of the case.”284  The 
traditional definition is frustratingly impractical to apply in distinguishing 
dicta from holding as it provides no specific guidance for statements made in 
case rationale.285  Case law offers little clarification on the matter,286 but 
dicta has been determined to include deliberate asides, discussion 
broadening a legal principle beyond the scope of the case, and components 
of the case rationale that are not determinative of the outcome.287  The 
doctrine of stare decisis, a central to the United States common law system, 
binds lower courts to adhere to the holdings of higher courts.288 Though stare 
decisis does not compel the lower courts to follow the dictum of the higher 
courts, courts can and do regard the dicta with varying levels of 
persuasiveness.289 
The ambiguous distinction between dicta and binding opinion requires a 
further analysis, assessing succeeding legal attitudes following the dicta.290 
In some cases, more persuasive dicta may evolve into law through 
subsequent judicial opinions or uniform adherence by lower courts. 291   
Conversely, dicta may also be dismissed entirely, either expressly through 
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later statements of the original court, or implicitly, through a succession of 
court rulings rejecting the dicta. 292   The persuasiveness of some dicta 
remains ambiguous, as it is neither adapted into law nor clearly rejected, as 
lower court interpretations reach assorted decisions, often choosing to 
disregard dicta altogether.293  Therefore, in analyzing the binding effect of a 
statement, subsequent legal treatment can be telling in the determination 
between holding and dicta. 
2. Dicta With Regard to Buck v. Bell 
In addressing Carrie Buck’s contentions that her substantive due process 
rights were violated, Justice Holmes applies the rational basis standard of 
review to the Virginia statute mandating her sterilization.294  Note that the 
Supreme Court’s various phrasings of the rational basis standard require the 
law to be somewhat relevant to any legitimate state interest, regardless of the 
specific legislative intent in drafting the law.295  The Virginia institution in 
Buck v. Bell recognized that while compulsory sterilization would deprive 
Carrie Buck of her liberty, it was in the interest of benefiting society, 
contending that mental disability or feeble-mindedness is hereditary.296  In 
analyzing such a claim as a legitimate government interest, Justice Holmes 
stated, “we cannot say as a matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if 
they exist they justify the result.” 297   Close reading of this statement 
indicates that while Justice Holmes was not rejecting outright a government 
interest in promoting eugenics, he was not expressly confirming such an 
interest either. Instead, this statement confirms that a legitimate state interest 
for such a law is potentially in existence.  The holding here, is that because 
the statute could relate to a legitimate state objective, Carrie Buck’s right to 
substantive due process was not violated. 
In defining what is dicta and what is holding, incorporating the doctrine of 
issue preclusion is essential towards determining what is essential to the 
facts of the case, and what is not.298  This requires identifying what is 
actually at issue, as either a matter of fact or law.299  It is important to note 
that the attack was not on the legitimacy of the state objective, as the 
contention at issue was that “in no circumstances could such an order be 
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justified.”300  The holding, then, was not concerned with the legitimacy of 
that state interest, but instead whether or not a state interest was possible at 
all.  Therefore, the holding is limited to the assertion that there was a 
conceivable legitimate purpose, and as a result, Carrie Buck’s due process 
rights were not violated. 
The holding does not include more abstract discussion of the overall 
worldwide benefits of mandatory sterilization policies. Justice Holmes’ 
subsequent discussion broadens beyond the focus on the potential existence 
or non-existence of a legitimate government interest.  Transitioning into a 
moralistic digression, the discussion widened the scope considerably, as 
evident through the statement, “[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of 
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for 
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind.”301  While this is a blatant endorsement of eugenicist 
policies, it is also dicta.  These statements broaden in scope, in contrast with 
their discussion specific to the Virginia law, where the language is vague 
and does not take the clear opportunity to confirm eugenic sterilization as a 
legitimate state interest.  Instead, this endorsement is confined to an aside, 
which broadens the scope to a more general perspective, engaging in a 
theoretical and idealistic testimonial no longer tailored to the Virginia 
statute. Thus, since dicta includes statements found in the rationale but not 
essential to the outcome of the case,302 it is material that the decision reached 
could be made without this fierce defense of eugenic policy as a legitimate 
government interest. 
3. Dicta as Reflective of Societal Attitude 
Failure to separate dicta from binding authority is dangerous because it 
allows courts, if mistaking dicta for the binding authority of the holding, to 
bind later courts to judicial attitudes no longer reflective of modern 
society.303  While dicta is not law binding later courts to adherence, it is still 
persuasive authority that, as history indicates, is not easily overlooked or 
questioned, as lower courts are not inclined to examine it with much 
diligence. 304   Appellate judges often successfully utilize this tendency 
towards reliance as a way to plant their broader ideological views into the 
law in order to attempt to ensure some later adherence.305  It logically 
follows then that dicta is a reflection of judicial attitude pertaining to the 
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time period in which the case was decided, which, in turn, provides insight 
into the overall societal views present in that specific era.  Holmes himself 
has written that judicial interpretation of the law is not entirely reached 
through pure logical analysis, but instead has more to do with the “felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories [and] even 
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men.”306  Here, Justice 
Holmes recognized that legal concepts shift over time as attitudes change in 
society. 
Using Holmes’ own logic, it is best to adhere to what is predictable and 
constant in terms of later interpretations.  History has shown, an emphasis on 
the procedural due process element rather than Holmes’ focus on protecting 
society’s right to weed out genetic inferiority.  This flexibility present in the 
growth and adjustment of legal concepts, is, according to Holmes, “both 
inevitable and desirable, enabling the law to adapt to new knowledge, to 
technological developments, and to changing social mores and values.”307 
Legal and societal views on sterilization and contraceptive issues as they 
relate to the mentally disabled have evolved, as later interpretations of the 
law explicitly disregard eugenic justifications for administering sterilization 
in favor of providing for the general welfare of the mentally disabled or 
incompetent.308  In light of the current legal trends, as reflected through the 
various state standards, it can hardly be argued that Holmes’ endorsement of 
a moral and ethical obligation to regulate reproduction to avoid overtaxing 
the welfare system is anything more than marginally persuasive dicta. 
Instead, because the opposite trend prevails, there is a heavy presumption 
against involuntary sterilization and it is not widely granted.  In light of the 
recent events of the Mary Moe case in Massachusetts, we see that the 
emphasis on procedural due process rights is intact, indicating that this part 
of Buck v. Bell was, in fact, binding authority.  The policy rationale behind 
such sterilization procedures clearly favors the interest and general well 
being of the disabled person, and not the strength of the gene pool.  This 
attitude is reflected clearly in the events of the recent Guardianship of Moe, 
where the trial judge’s motivations for originally granting the sterilization 
were explicitly to protect Mary Moe’s best interest.309  This indicates that, 
since such a focus on fair procedure has held steadfast, and the eugenicist 
principles have, in fact, not. Holmes’ inflammatory view, therefore, was 
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never actually regarded as binding authority.  Rather, it is an ideological 
remnant of long-abandoned perspectives that remains dicta, and dicta alone. 
  CONCLUSION  
Buck v. Bell has long been a subject of legal criticism and public stigma, 
despite no subsequent efforts to overturn the law.  Instead, the United States 
Supreme Court has largely declined to address Buck v. Bell and most 
involuntary sterilization statues, shifting its focus towards the inclusion of 
reproductive rights under the right to privacy.  Following a mass repeal of 
state statutes authorizing eugenic sterilization in furtherance of societal 
benefits, states’ current sterilization statutes reflect an interest in individual 
protections, defending compliance with the protections afforded by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The inflammatory legacy of Buck v. Bell is largely unfounded.  Instead, 
public revulsion towards Buck v. Bell is a product of societal sensitivity 
towards eugenicist-based policies and an expansion of the protections under 
the right to privacy.  A closer reading of the decision indicates an emphasis 
on procedural due process, requiring states to afford procedural safeguards 
in such statutes.  Since Holmes’ broad theoretical endorsement of eugenics 
is tangential to the substantive due process analysis, it is dicta, and merely 
indicative of societal attitudes of the time. Most telling is the subsequent 
focus of case law on creating strong procedural safeguards, which, in 
conjunction with a shift in societal rejection of eugenic sterilization policies. 
This indicates largely, that the inflammatory defense of eugenics is in fact, 
dicta, and not binding authorization of eugenics as a constant legitimate state 
interest. The impact of this is already evident in modern state sterilization, 
which present standards so strict they act as an effective safeguard by 
creating hurdles for granting sterilization. Recognition of Holmes’ 
inflammatory statements as dicta will only further these efforts, no longer 
allowing stringent state laws to hide behind a strict reading of Buck v. Bell. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
